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Traveling to Washington D.C. in 1942, Parsons was ultimately selected to serve in the OP-20-G, (Office of Chief of Naval Operations, 20th Division of the Office of Naval Communications, G Section), whose mission it was to decode and translate enemy communications.
The vulnerability of Japanese naval codes and ciphers was crucial to the conduct of World War II, and had an important influence on foreign relations between Japan and the west in the years leading up to the war as well. Every Japanese code was eventually broken, and the intelligence gathered made possible such operations as the victorious American ambush of the Japanese Navy at Midway in 1942 (by breaking code JN-25b) and the shooting down of Japanese admiral Isoroku Yamamoto a year later in Operation Vengeance.
The Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) used many codes and ciphers. All of these cryptosystems were known differently by different organizations; the names listed below are those given by Western cryptanalytic operations.
The Red Book code was an IJN code book system used in World War I and after. It was called "Red Book" because the American photographs made of it were bound in red covers. It should not be confused with the RED cipher used by the diplomatic corps.
This code consisted of two books. The first contained the code itself; the second contained an additive cipher which was applied to the codes before transmission, with the starting point for the latter being embedded in the transmitted message. A copy of the code book was obtained in a "black bag" operation on the luggage of a Japanese naval attache in 1923; after three years of work Agnes Driscoll was able to break the additive portion of the code.
A succession of codes used to communicate between Japanese naval installations. These were comparatively easily broken by British codebreakers in Singapore and are believed to have been the source of early indications of imminent naval war preparations.
JN-25 is the name given by codebreakers to the main, and most secure, command and control communications scheme used by the IJN during World War II. Named as the 25th Japanese Navy system identified, it was initially given the designation AN-1 as a "research project" rather than a "current decryption" job. The project required reconstructing the meaning of thirty thousand code groups and piecing together thirty thousand random additives.
By April 1942 JN25 was about 20 percent readable, so codebreakers could read "about one in five words" and traffic analysis was far more useful.  Tiltman had devised a (slow; neither easy nor quick) method of breaking it and had noted that all the numbers in the codebook were divisible by three. "Breaking" rather than "solving" a code involves learning enough code words and indicators so that any given message can be read. 
The American effort was directed from Washington, D.C. by the U.S. Navy's signals intelligence command, OP-20-G; at Pearl Harbor it was centered at the Navy's Combat Intelligence Unit (Station HYPO, also known as COM 14), led by Commander Joseph Rochefort. However, in 1942 not every cryptogram was decoded, as Japanese traffic was too heavy for the undermanned Combat Intelligence Unit. With the assistance of Station CAST (also known as COM 16, jointly commanded by Lts Rudolph Fabian and John Lietwiler) in the Philippines, and the British Far East Combined Bureau in Singapore, and using a punched card tabulating machine manufactured by International Business Machines, a successful attack was mounted against the 4 December 1941 edition (JN25b). Together they made considerable progress by early 1942. "Cribs" exploited common formalities in Japanese messages, such as "I have the honor to inform your excellency" (see known plaintext attack).
This was a naval code used by merchant ships (commonly known as the "maru code"), broken in May 1940. 28 May 1941, when the whale factory ship Nisshin Maru No. 2 (1937) visited San Francisco, U.S. Customs Service Agent George Muller and Commander R. P. McCullough of the U.S. Navy's 12th Naval District (responsible for the area) boarded her and seized her codebooks, without informing Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI). Copies were made, clumsily, and the originals returned. The Japanese quickly realized JN-39 was compromised, and replaced it with JN-40.
JN-40 was originally believed to be a code super-enciphered with a numerical additive, in the same way as JN-25. However, in September 1942, an error by the Japanese gave clues to John MacInnes and Brian Townend, codebreakers at the British FECB, Kilindini. It was a fractionating transposition cipher based on a substitution table of 100 groups of two figures each followed by a columnar transposition. By November 1942, they were able to read all previous traffic and break each message as they received it. Enemy shipping, including troop convoys, was thus trackable, exposing it to Allied attack. Over the next two weeks they broke two more systems, the "previously impenetrable" JN167 and JN152.
A simple transposition and substitution cipher used for broadcasting navigation warnings. In 1942 after breaking JN-40 the FECB at Kilindini broke JN-152 and the previously impenetrable JN-167, another merchant shipping cypher.
In June 1942 the Chicago Tribune, run by isolationist Col. Robert R. McCormick, published an article implying that the United States had broken the Japanese codes, saying the U.S. Navy knew in advance about the Japanese attack on Midway Island, and published dispositions of the Japanese invasion fleet. The executive officer of Lexington, Commander Morton T. Seligman (who was transferred to shore duties), had shown Nimitz's executive order to reporter Stanley Johnston.
In early August, a RAN intercept unit in Melbourne heard Japanese messages, using a superseded lower-grade code. Changes were made to codebooks and the call-sign system, starting with the new JN-25 codebook (issued two months before). However the changes indicated the Japanese believed the Allies had worked out the fleet details from traffic analysis or had obtained a codebook and additive tables, being reluctant to believe that anyone could have broken their codes (least of all a Westerner).
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Ancient codes prompt associations with treasure hunts and conspiracies as depicted in The Da Vinci Code. But mysterious codes are not just the stuff of fiction and films. Real-life Vikings and medieval Norse people carved runic codes onto sticks of wood, stones and other objects.
The use of the code as a tool in learning is not as odd as it might seem. There were no rune schools then but knowledge of this alphabet could be transferred from generation to generation by linking it to games, poetry, drills and codes, Nordby says.
He is working on his doctorate in runes. Nordby is the first person to study all the findings of runic codes in Northern Europe, around 80 inscriptions. His PhD research has taken him to several countries to analyse runic inscriptions dating back as far as 800 AD.
Nine of the 80 or so coded runic writings that Nordby has investigated are written in the jötunvillur code. The others are written in cipher runes and with the use of Caesar cipher, a system involving a shift to letters a few places away in the alphabet. The latter two codes have been understood by researchers for some time.
He agrees that the codes could have been used as a tool for learning runes. But he is uncertain how big a role this would have played in the learning process. In any case, Williams thinks the codes were used for much more than communication.
Cracking Codes with Python teaches complete beginners how to program in the Python programming language. The book features the source code to several ciphers and hacking programs for these ciphers. The programs include the Caesar cipher, transposition cipher, simple substitution cipher, multiplicative & affine ciphers, Vigenere cipher, and hacking programs for each of these ciphers. The final chapters cover the modern RSA cipher and public key cryptography.
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